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Clinical Education a t the Crossroads:
The Need for Direction
David R. Barnhizer*
In Bridging t h e G a p : Legal E d u c a t i o n and L a w y e r
Competency, Gordon Gee and Donald Jackson have made a significant contribution to the legal profession and, more specifically, to legal educators. As part of their study the authors conclude that there is general confusion about clinical education
among both traditional teachers of law and clinicians. The existence of this conceptual deficiency not only is intellectually disturbing, but also has significantly impeded many needed improvements in our current legal education system. Clinical instruction has always possessed the unique potential to advance
legal education in several important areas. It has, however, now
reached a critical juncture where events of the next several years
will determine whether it is accepted as an essential and legitimate part of legal education or merely survives on a limited scale
as an interesting but incidental part of the legal c u r r i ~ u l u m . ~
This Commentary rests on five premises. The first is that it
is both possible and necessary to understand clinical legal education as a general instructional method. The second is that all legal
educators must become more willing to reexamine and clarify the
purposes of legal education and to engage in discussion about the
primary educational goals to be served. The third premise is that
different educational methods possess distinct capabilities for the
attainment of specific educational goals and that certain applications of the clinical method are manifestly superior vehicles to
facilitate learning in the area of "professional responsibility."
The fourth is that the teaching of professional responsibility
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Legal Education, Cleveland
State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Chairman, Association of American
Law Schools Section on Clinical Education, 1977-1979. A.B., Muskingum, 1966; J.D.,
Ohio State, 1969; LL.M., Harvard, 1972.
The author wishes to acknowledge the much-appreciated editorial assistance of Sheri
A. Schoenberg.
1. The period of 1970-1976 witnessed an explosive growth in clinical programs. In
1970, 100 law schools reported 169 credit-granting clinical programs. By 1976, 139 law
a LEGAL
EDUCATION
schools reported 494 clinical programs. See Gee, Foreword to C o u ~ c ON
FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY,
INC., SURVEY
AND DIRECTORY
OF CLINICAL
LEGAL
EDUCATION: 1976-1977, at xvi (1977). Qualitative improvements in clinical programs, however,
have not kept pace with the numerical growth.
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should become a highly emphasized goal of legal education. The
final premise is that the clinical method can be legitimately
adapted throughout the legal curriculum; however, different adaptations of the clinical method will generate dissimilar kinds of
learning. In this regard, three models for the implementation of
the clinical method, designated as the strict, specialized, and
complementary models, are set out in the final portion of the
Commentary.
Clinical education emerged in the late 1960's as a tool to aid
in the reformation of legal education, and while it is too early to
gauge precisely the impact clinical education has had on legal
education generally, it is accurate to describe its effect as more
than insignificant but less than substantial. Ten years after the
beginning of the clinical expl~sion,~
it now appears that traditional legal educators have learned that clinical education can be
tolerated. Unfortunately, the tolerance seems to stem from the
belief that clinical education presents no real challenge to the way
law schools have functioned for the past century. Since there has
been a stark absence of any substantial effort to analyze and test
the merits of traditional and clinical legal education, this belief
is evidently based solely on the failure of clinical educators to
articulate effectively the significant strengths of the clinical
method. While it is true that clinical education remains a clouded
methodology, the failure to clarify that methodology does not rest
solely with clinical educators. A combination of factors-lower
status, lower pay, longer hours, inadequate resources, lack of
administrative support, large numbers of students and cases, frequent staff turnover among many lower-line clinical positions,
and the incessant demands of real clients and court schedules-have made it extremely difficult for clinical educators to
stop long enough to give thoughtful direction to clinical programs.
These factors, coupled with the need for the clinical instructor to
legitimate himself based on traditional standards for purposes of
tenure and promotion, have tended to establish numerous barriers that have effectively impeded the theoretical and practical
development of clinical education.
Taken cumulatively, these barriers have significantly threatened the realization of the revolutionary role of clinical education
vis-a-vis traditional legal education. Unless these barriers are
dealt with directly and the proper applications of the clinical
2. The clinical explosion began in 1968 with the founding of the Council on Legal
Education for Professional Responsibility, Inc.
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method are clarified, the reform of legal education will be diverted far short of its goal. It must be stated that this goal is not
the destruction of traditional legal education, but rather the aiding of its evolution beyond its 19th century roots to include an
expanded definition of its primary purposes, to respond to fundamental changes in the needs of the legal profession, and to better
serve the interests of a larger portion of society than has historically occurred. This Commentary has been written in the interest
of establishing and articulating what should be the proper relationship between the traditional and clinical methods of instruction.

Christopher Langdell's casebook method was a revolutionary
response to what was generally accepted as an inadequate
method of legal instruction. It was revolutionary in its simplicity
and, for the primary reformation needs of the 1870'9, in its effectiveness. It was in many ways a better tool for facilitating certain
kinds of learning than the methods previously in use.3 As a
method it can be easily defined. The casebook method involves
the collection of (primarily) appellate cases pertaining to a discrete subject-matter area into an edited casebook for the purpose
of providing the content of the student's educational experience.
The instructor decides how to direct the learning process, selects
specific educational goals, and then uses a variety of teaching
techniques to achieve these goals. The subject matter of any particular application of the casebook method is the product of an
evolving process characterized by changing court decisions, legislation, and social trends. It is selected and interpreted by prominent commentators, judges, and lawyers and presented through
the use of various collections of substantive and often esoteric
ca~es.~
Just as the casebook method was a reform measure aimed a t
the perceived narrowness of the apprentice method with its at3. A major problem of the Langdellian casebook method, however, has resulted from
the high faculty-student ratios that have characterized its application. This has had the
effect of locking legal education into an instructional model that is extremely difficult to
change.
4. Interestingly, it is not only the law student who receives his initial understanding
of the legal system through exposure to this carefully distilled vicarious data but also the
law instructor. Law teachers generally have very limited "practical" legal experience and
rely upon the second- and third-hand experience represented by appellate cases.
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tendant nonanalytic lectures on legal rules,5 the clinical method
is a response to casebook-method deficiencies in the teaching of
professional responsibility and lawyer skills. It must, however, be
understood that, while the casebook method is found wanting in
several areas, the clinical method is inadequate in others. Indeed,
the most effective method of legal education is neither the clinical
nor the casebook, but instead a careful combination of these two
complementary yet distinct vehicles. On the theoretical plane the
only difference between the Langdellian casebook method and
the clinical method of law instruction is in the nature of what is
collected to provide the essential material studied by the law
student. While the casebook method relies on collections of vicarious legal experiences for its educational content, the clinical
method uses direct or "firsthand" legal experience as the raw
material to be shaped and molded by the law i n s t r u ~ t o rIf. ~we
begin with this basic definitional distinction between the casebook and clinical methods, it is possible to understand the real
nature of clinical education and the critical challenge it poses to
both traditional legal education as it has existed for the past one
hundred years and the basic values of many law instructors occupying positions of authority within the existing educational
structure.'
5. The acceptance of the Langdellian casebook method of instruction in law was
widespread by the 1920's. See Thorne, Professional Education in Law, in E. HUGHES,B.
A. GURIN,& D. WILLIAMS,
EDUCATION
FOR THE PROFESSIONS
OF
THORNE,A. DEBAGGIS,
MEDICINE,
LAW,THEOLOGY,
AND SCCIAL
WELFARE
101, 103 (1973) (report to the Carnegie
Commission on Higher Education). The interaction of the Socratic dialogue and the
casebook method still serves as the basic model of law teaching. See Boyer & Cramton,
American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and Reform, 59 CORNELL
L. REV.221,
224 (1974).
6. The terms "vicarious" and "direct" legal experience differentiate the kinds of raw
educational data generally used to provide the basis of nonclinical and clinical methodologies respectively. Vicarious experience is that with which the student first comes in contact after it has been filtered through several sets of perceptions (those of casebook writers,
editors, judges, and teachers). Direct legal experience denotes that which the student
experiences "firsthand" before the above perceptual filtering occurs. The nature of the
direct experiencing can vary with regard to the degree of involvement, e.g., full participation in the lawyering role, "involved observation," or mere observation.
7. To understand the current needs of legal education, one must perceive its present
location along the "birth-stagnancy-rebirth" continuum. Arthur Koestler perhaps best
described this process:
The new territory opened up by the impetuous advance of a few geniuses, acting
as a spearhead, is subsequently occupied by the solid phalanxes of mediocrity;
and soon the revolution turns into a new orthodoxy, . . . and ultimately, estrangement from reality. . . . The emergent orthodoxy hardens into a "closed
system" of thought, unwilling or unable to assimilate a new empirical data or
to adjust itself to significant changes in other fields of knowledge; sooner or later
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Generally speaking, it can be stated that the purpose of legal
education is to teach the essence of lawyering. While consensus
concerning the content of this "essence" could likely not be
reached among today's legal educators, it is assumed in this Commentary to include (1)the ability to "think like a lawyer," (2) the
ability to transform this analytical process into predictive decisionmaking capabilities for the proper counseling of clients, and
(3) the ability to understand and act consistently within the relationship, role, and responsibility of the attorney to society,
clients, and the legal process.

A. Educational Goals
These general criteria can, in turn, be grouped into four distinct educational goal categories. The first is sound analysis and
judgment. This includes issue recognition and analysis; strategy,
tactics, and decisionmaking; and synthesis and generalization.
The second category is knowledge of the law. This consists of an
understanding of the formal body of substantive and procedural
law at a given point in time. The third area is development of
technical legal skills. Included in the objective group of skills are
interviewing, counseling, negotiation, investigation, research,
writing, and trial and appellate advocacy. The final category is
an understanding of professional responsibility. As used here, this
category emcompasses awareness of the system of ethical proscriptions applicable to the legal profession, a grasp of ethical
philosophy, awareness of the demands and nature of the lawyering role and an attorney's individual relationship to norms of
behavior, understanding of one's own system of personal values,
awareness and understanding of major institutions and their effects on society, recognition of the need for constructive systemic
reform and for some commitment thereto, and awareness of societal problems and their cause^.^
the matrix is blocked, a new crises arises, leading to a new synthesis, and the
cycle starts again.
A. KOESTLER,
THEACT OF CREATION
225-26 (1964):
Without question, Christopher Langdell deserves to be included within Koestler's
category of "genius." That legal education has been "occupied by the solid phalanxes of
mediocrity" for several decades and is only now emerging from that condition is equally
unquestionable. Part of the impetus of the emergence has been generated by clinical
education, but it would be both unfair and absurd to ignore the significant number of
nonclinical law faculties who are contributing to the reform.
8. These different goal subcategories require the use of different educational meth-
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The formulation of these instructional goals is only one step
in the process of deciding specifically what and how to teach? The
decisionmaking process becomes more complex when other factors are taken into consideration, factors such as desired degrees
of learning, limited time and resources, and available methodologies. Most legal educators would agree that law schools should
teach some aspects of each of the general goal categories. The
disagreement begins when priorities must be set. At this point the
value systems of the decisionmakers assert a decisive influence.
Over the past century it has been the value system of an entrenched majority that has determined the consistent use of the
casebook method and the Socratic dialogue. Moreover, it has
become increasingly apparent t h a t the present difficulty of
"legitimating" clinical methodologies is far less an issue of researching, testing, and presenting theoretical and empirical justifications than it is a conflict in basic value systems.'O The real
ods. A traditional seminar may be adequate to teach the technical content of the American
Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility whereas generating an "awareness of
the demands and nature of the lawyering role and an attorney's individual relationship
to norms of behavior" would require a radically different technique.
9. The very approach (or lack thereof) that the profession has taken in answering
these questions has sent us toward a destination about which there is scant consensus.
One thing evident in clinical education (and in legal education generally) is that we have
not fulfilled the basic intellectual obligation of determining where we want to go; therefore, it should come as little surprise that we are uncertain how to get there.
10. The conflict involves an entire series of values. Taken as a whole, they represent
different perspectives on the role of the lawyer in society vis-a-vis the distribution of legal
services to different social classes and economic groups, the legitimacy of "legal reality"
as a discipline to be studied and for which law students should be prepared, the commitment to criticize specific problems within the profession and to take steps to remedy those
problems, and the proper focus of the system of legal education. The most debated sources
of conflict are (1) a rejection by many clinical instructors of both the assumption that
lawyers exist only to preserve the interests of the rich, the propertied, and the powerful
and the corollary that law teachers have the inalienable right to shape the curriculum to
further this assumption; (2) the assertion by clinical education that there is an essential
human dimension to lawyering which traditional legal education ignores and which must
be included in the curriculum; (3) the contention that instruction in professional responsibility must begin in law school and that certain aspects of professional responsibility (e.g.,
systemic reform, criticism of the profession, quality of legal services) will create substantial conflict with the legal profession and other powerful groups in society; (4) the position
that education in the skills of law is a valid and vital part of legal education and that the
curriculum and its resources must be expanded to include this instruction; and (5) the
assertion that these reforms make it essential that perspectives about what credentials
qualify one to be a law teacher be reconsidered and that the test of an individual's
suitability for teaching law be expanded to include factors other than law review editorship, judicial clerkship, and/or two years of research clerking for a prestigious Eastern law
firm.
While other specific conflicts exist, it is these-the equitable distribution of legal
services, the qualifications of the law teacher, and the inclusion of education goals of
humanism, skills, and professional responsibility-that provide the source. It is also clear

'
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resistance to clinical education has arisen because (1) it represents fundamental change in goals and priorities, (2) it brings
onto law faculties different kinds of persons with seemingly different values, and (3) it presents, a t the very least, an implicit
challenge both to the validity of what traditional academics have
been doing individually and institutionally for many years and to
the role they will be expected to play in the future. Despite the
fundamental value conflict, or perhaps because of it, there is a
need to conceptualize more clearly the theoretical dimensions of
the clinical method of instruction.

B. The Degree and Kind of Learning Sought
The mere decision to teach "contracts" or "civil procedure"
has little intrinsic meaning. The instructor must make preliminary decisions about the degree and kind of learning desired. In
this context, the questions of degree and kind include whether the
teacher should seek full or substantial understanding or merely
simple awareness and, more specifically, how extensively the instructor should deal with the subject matter in terms of both
scope of coverage and depth of treatment? These questions are
extremely important since their answers will dictate the selection
of instructional models, teaching techniques, and course formats
used by the instructor. The involvement of the student with the
directly experienced subject matter of the clinical legal process
provides a potential richness and kind of course content that
cannot be equalled by traditional methodology. The essential distinction is that in clinical courses the student is a participant in
the substance of the learning rather than a mere observer and as
a result the student can simultaneously perceive the experiential
content of the course on intellectual, emotional, and professional
planes. Thus, the educational goals sought and the degree or kind
of learning desired are significant factors in determining whether
the casebook or the clinical method should be used.
that some of the disagreement represent unalterable differences in an individual's "world
view" and can almost certainly not be resolved. Opposition, therefore, to clinical legal
education would likely exist even if Langdell were to reappear and propose to improve the
traditional casebook method. In this mode, resistance to change uses tradition as a justification that is often without substance.
11. In its simplest form, the legal curriculum already reflects these dimensions of
learning. Although the curricular structure is not wholly integrated, the first year represents an introductory or broad survey approach while the learning of the second and third
years includes both additional breadth, only partially building on first-year courses (Corporations, Federal Income Tax), and depth (advanced seminars with prerequisites).
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Much of the real opposition to clinical education stems from
the fact that it is the primary and most visible medium through
which an assault on the century-old citadel of legal education is
being conducted. As such, the disagreements are not really those
based upon the quality of a particular methodology, but are actually conflicts between persons with radically different priorities
about what should be the nature of legal education and the legal
profession. As has been stated, the real conflict to a large extent
is one of fundamental goals and values. Thus, for clinical educators constantly to attempt to respond to demands for strict proof
that specific adaptations of the clinical method can produce
"something" of intellectual substance, rather than to confront
clearly and firmly the critical issues, is to travel a tangent that
impairs the probability of attaining needed educational reforms.
With regard to educational goals, the central issue is whether
or not the acquisition of technical competency skills and a proper
sense of professional responsibility are to be added as full partners to the educational objectives of law school. Before this issue
can be treated, however, the purposes of legal education within
the broader contexts of the legal profession and society in general
must be determined.12 The special realities of our century and
society may well require a different emphasis and approach than
traditional methods. Indeed, just as the Langdellian model was
developed in the 19th ceotury to rectify perceived deficiencies in
the then-existing apprentice-lecture method, so now there is a
need to identify and correct any deficiencies in the present system
of legal education. This requires a close examination of what
present-day society needs from its lawyers.13
Because clinical education has brought these challenges of
reform and introspection into the sanctuary of the law school in
what admittedly has often been an incoherent and stumbling
fashion, the clinical method has not been received with favor by
many traditional academics. The expansion of clinical courses
12. See generally J. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL
JUSTICE
3-13 (1976).
13. As Professor Thorne has noted:
The implicit goal of law schools is to create successful lawyers, not to provide
an equitable distribution of legal services. The biases of the practicing profession
are reflected in the law school curricula, in the methods of teaching, and in the
career models implicit in the course of training itself.
Law school curricula are oriented to the interests of the rich and propertied.
Thorne, supra note 5, at 122.
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over the past decade has added to law faculties individuals with
approaches and values different than those of many traditional
legal educators. In many instances these clinicians have possessed inferior academic credentials in relation to their traditional c~unterparts.~"nitially, when the nature of the challenge
to traditional legal education was perceived more clearly by both
clinical instructors and academics, the confrontation of value systems produced significant tensions.15 Somewhere along the way,
however, the edges of the conflict were blunted by the pressures
of general clinical work as well as by the constant struggle of
clinical instructors simply to survive and justify the existence of
their individual courses.l% addition to these pressures came an
expansion of the nonclinical curriculum into the areas of skills
teaching and professional responsibility. These limited changes
have undercut much of the momentum of clinical education. During this same time, clinical instructors were subject to the basic
human need to be accepted by their traditional faculty peers and
in many ways found their willingness to strongly confront the
values of the existing educational system diminishing.17What has
14. Gee and Jackson note that "[olne traditional career route for the legal scholar
is from a high-ranking position in his law school class (preferably a t a prestigious school
and with law review experience),to a judicial clerkship, and then to an assistant professorship in a law school." Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer
Competency, 1977 B.Y.U.L. REV.927-63. This same pattern has often not been applicable to clinical educators. Whether clinical instructors should fit into the same mold is also
open to question, but this is not to say that high standards should not be demanded of
instuctors hired for clinical positions. Too often, given the second-class rank of the clinical
instructor in many law schools, it is difficult both to attract and to keep well-qualified
people.
15. Clinical instructors have tended to come from a legal services or public defender
background as opposed to the customary law-firmljudicial-clerkshiproute for traditional
academics. The difference in both experience and values this reflects has set clinical
educators at the activist core of efforts to reform the institution of legal education. The
energy of this reform was fueled by the clear conflict between values. Now that clinical
education has become more or less accepted, however, both the tension and critical energy
levels have lessened.
16. From June 1974 to June 1975, this author conducted a detailed study of the
clinical activities of 62 students a t Cleveland State University. Some of the students
received 12 academic credits for their clinical work while others received either nine or
five credits. The study shows that an instructor supervising the field work of six students
each receiving 12 credits was required to spend approximately 33.0 hours per week with
the students. This included involvement in client interviewing and counseling sessions,
negotiations, formal and informal conferences, trials, clinical seminars, and the miscellaneous tasks shared between the clinical instructor and student. The corresponding figures
for students receiving nine and five credits were 20.2 and 15.7 hours per week. Since these
data neither reflect the randomness of much of the stated time commitment nor account
for any preparation time, it is apparent that there is little time left for the clinical instructor to research, write, reflect, and undertake other teaching commitments.
17. As clinical instructors increase their tenures on law faculties, it is natural to
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been produced is a generation of clinical educators without any
real perception of the broader issues that are at stake. Thus, it is
not surprising to find that whatever enthusiasm for reform has
remained among clinical educators has often been expressed in a
less than articulate and compelling manner. As a result, rather
than having accomplished effective reform in legal education by
the end of the next decade, clinical education, and more importantly the work of those who seek broad change in the nature of
legal education in terms of values and goals, may be relegated to
an inconsequential footnote in the history of legal education.
The first step that must be taken to determine whether clinical education is a viable tool for constructive and fundamental
reform of legal education is to understand that conceptually the
clinical method has potential applicability throughout the legal
curriculum, independent of specific subject matter? The next
step is to determine in what circumstances it is necessary to
involve the student in the directly experienced subject matter of
the clinical process. If we accept that the casebook methodology
might be inadequate for certain educational purposes, why is the
clinical method any more adequate?

IV. THEUNIQUE
EDUCATIONAL
FUNCTION
OF THE CLINICAL
METHOD
IN THE

TEACHING
OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY

While the clinical method can be adapted for use throughout
the curriculum, the educational goals of analysis, substantive
law, and skills training can often be met more satisfactorily
through nonclinical approaches. The most unique capabilities of
the clinical method lie within the goal category of professional
resp~nsibility.'~
A major purpose of this Commentary is to preexpect they will be more inclined to accept a t least part of the perspective held by
traditional colleagues. The combination of vested interests, peer pressure, and the heavy
and frenetic character of actual clinical teaching can tend to convert the clinical teacher
into a rough parody of the traditional academic. In the future this conversion may well
be evidenced by the evolution of clinical courses into more traditional classroom formats.
The difficulty may be further intensified in that once an innovation is accepted
it may as a result become routine, "deflated," more and more removed from its
original impetus. Those who participate in its perpetuation-its originators and
their initial close collaborators-tend to become less interested in it; indeed,
their whole relation to these mainsprings of creativity may become attenuated.
Eisenstadt, Introduction to M. WEBER,ON CHARISMA
AND INSTITUTION
BUILDING
a t xvii (S.
Eisenstadt ed. 1968).
18. See Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical
Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL
EDUCATION
FOR THE LAWSTUDENT
374 (1973).
19. For a list of the seven subcategories of this goal category, see text accompanying
note 8 supra.

10251

CLINICAL EDUCATION AT T H E CROSSROADS

1035

sent a specifically adapted model of the clinical method designed
to teach an affirmative system of professional responsibility. This
"strict model" of the clinical method, presented hereafter, is offered as the best available method by which an affirmative, coherent, and personalized system of professional values and responsibility can be created for most law students.

A.

T h e Importance of Teaching Professional Responsibility

That the teaching of professional responsibility should be a
part of the goal priorities of legal education is universally accepted. That it should become one of the most important goals
of legal education is a fundamental premise of this Commentary.
What is intended here by the term "professional responsibility"
is more than a mere awareness of the rules and debated issues of
resp~nsibility.~~
The casebook method is far less expensive than
the clinical method in that regard and is capable of developing
an awareness of these matters. What is needed, however, is the
development of the individual law student's ethical dimension
through significant growth in the student's understanding and
ability to interpret himself in relation to specified values. Most
desirably, professional responsibility should become an integral
part of the individual-not simply another bit of data to be heard
a t an intellectual level and forgotten. It is a series of judgments
and value orientations that become both an explicit and implicit
part of the individual's decisionmaking and professional behavior. The achieving of this level of understanding demands educational experiences that are capable of providing a source and kind
of involvement penetrating enough to cultivate the clarification
of values, and flexible enough to allow the instructor to guide the
experience into a functional structure. This level of understanding is developed not in sole relation to intellectual theories of
ethical behavior, but in response to the kinds of actual forces that
will confront, challenge, and tend to seduce the person as a lawyer.
20. See COUNCIL
ON LEGAL
EDUCATION
FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY,
INC.,THIRD
REPORT,
1973-1974, at 8, 9 (1974).
BIENNIAL
There is a deeper part of us which must be reached if the ethical lesson is
to stay with us for future use, and which cannot be reached by the same teaching
methods that are so valuable in teaching the doctrinal part of the law school
curriculum . . . . Intellectual considerations alone are not strong enough to
control our actions.
Id. at 9.
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The Potential for Biased Understandings of Professional
Responsibility

New experience, particularly when outside an individual's
established frame of reference, is initially a swirl of confusing
impressions. Most persons become extremely vulnerable when
thrust into very unfamiliar situations and seek immediately to
gain meaning from experiences not yet understood. The degree of
vulnerability depends upon the unfamiliarity of the new experiences and upon the coping abilities of the individual. Of necessity
we each seek to achieve order and structure and to systematize
the relative chaos of the unfamiliar? In so doing, we tend to be
more open and receptive to suggestion and to rely on external
sources to interpret the meaning of what we are experien~ing.~~
There are two points in a law student's career when this
phenomenon takes place. The first occurs during the initial year
of law school; the second is actual entry into the profession. When
beginning law school, with rare exception, law students are
wholly unprepared for the alien nature of the legal education
environment. The unknown subject matter, the mysteries of legal
principles, the immense volume of material, and the unique intensity of the law professor all combine to create in the student a
compelling need for meaning and understanding concerning these
new experiences. As a result, the law student is rendered extremely receptive and malleable. The law professor then becomes
the willing beneficiary of the student's fear, confusion, and desire
to succeed within the system. This gives law instructors an artificially charismatic power of such intensity that, when taken cumulatively across the curriculum, the instructors and the institutional process itself can literally shape the minds and values of
new studenW3
--

--

21. See Ausubel, Cognitive Structure and the Facilitation of Meaningful Verbal
Learning 14 J . TCHR.EDUC.217 (1963). "[Elxisting cognitive structure, that is, an individual's organization, stability, and clarity of knowledge in a particular subject matter
field a t any given time, is the principal factor influencing the learning and retention of
meaningful new material." Id. a t 217.
22. The external sources available include the law teachers, textbooks, and other law
students. Dr. Alan Stone offers some useful insights into the value problems of law students and the timing of the "crystallization of ideology" in relation to the transition from
youth to adulthood. In many ways the law student is in a prolonged adolescence preparing
to become an adult upon entry into the profession. See Stone, Legal Education on the
Couch, 85 HARV.L. REV.392, 398-400 (1971).
23. For a discussion of "charisma of the office," see Eisenstadt, supra note 17, a t xxi.
Dr. Stone analyzes the power and impact of the Socratic teacher and concludes that "[ilt
must be admitted that the professor has a n enormous potential impact on the student."
Stone, supra note 22, a t 411. See generally id. a t 411-18.
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The second primary point a t which the uncertainty becomes
so powerful as to generate extreme vulnerability is when students
leave the study of casebooks for the world of reality. Just as many
cultures have constructed rituals for passage from one status to
another, the legal profession has created a combination of formal
and informal rituals24to inculcate attitudes and values in new
lawyers. Law students endure years of delayed gratification to
achieve passage into membership in the legal profession. Even a t
this point, however, the emerging attorney knows virtually nothing of what it means to be a lawyer and is often very uncertain
as to whether he is capable of the required performance. The new
system he enters has many rules and processes, and the only
certainty the novice attorney has is that he is absolutely uncertain. He seeks understanding, therefore, from those who appear
to have been successful or who are simply there in times of need.
Just as he learned the peculiar system of law school from his
professors and fellow students, the new attorney now learns the
roles of the "reality" of being a lawyer from the teachers and peers
of his new environment.
The new teachers are judges, senior partners, other associates, agency personnel, bailiffs, clerks, and clients. Too often
these persons are as unknowing and confused as the recent law
graduate. Since law schools have largely chosen to ignore the
realties of lawyering and the harsh informal code of professional
responsibility, the student does not have sufficient preparation to
enable him either to understand or to cope with the professional
experience. Where does this leave him? The values he sees are the
values of peers, employers, and judges. Together, the perceived
expectations and behavior of these figures provide a perspective
by which the new lawyer interprets himself in relation to the
system. He uses these role models to help him sort out the meaning of the system and his proper role within it. If he patterns his
behavior after the apparent standard until he himself understands the norm, he can avoid the appearance of ignorance and
the reality of embarrassment. Unfortunately, however, this
"understanding" most often rises no higher than mere emulation.
Values, attitudes, performance, and compromises are developed
largely in response to these perceived standards and are therefore
consistent with the expectations of the dominant behavioral
norms of the system. That those standards and expectations often
24. Such rituals include bar exams, swearing-in ceremonies, and the law school experience itself.
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tend to run directly counter to the lawyer's professed ideals, standards of performance, and values is ascertainable by anyone who
attempts to function in the legal system.
The problems of proper value assimilation upon entry into
the professional world can be ameliorated to a large extent
through careful use of the direct legal experiences of the clinical
method in law school. In such a setting, issues of professional
responsibility can be met, confronted, and interpreted in such a
way as to increase the likelihood of the law student developing an
understanding of professional responsibility that is more consistent with the best definitions of the legal profession. In this educational process, the confusion and vulnerability occur when the
"working through" process can be guided by a teacher; the experience will therefore be more clearly understood by the student.
At the time of entry into the profession, the law student will have
extensively analyzed his behavior in relation to clients, judges,
bar associations, and the legal system in general and made decisions as to how he will function. This can result in a more coherent and functional understanding of the legal system that has not
heretofore occurred. The environment of direct experience, confrontation between system and self, and the mediating guidance
of the teacher combine to produce the learning experience.

C.

T h e Difficulty of Teaching Professional Responsibility

The traditional casebook method is generally not as effective
as direct clinical experience in assisting the learning of professional responsibility. Under the casebook method, students are
kept in ignorance of the reality of the systems they will confront,
and are a t the mercy of casebook writers and instructors who
establish the agenda within which the students must function.
Students who are permitted only. carefully distilled second- and
third-hand experiences are often unable to break out of the specific framework thrust upon them without a countervailing experience base from which to achieve perspective. The result is the
frequent and unwarranted acceptance of perceived existing standards of behavior upon entry into the profession.
Too often, however, direct experience is itself not a magically
effective learning facilitator, but rather a morass of confusion for
the individual who is not prepared to recognize and interpret the
information in a meaningful way. Without the aid of a competent
clinical instructor, the person who experiences immediate and
direct reality does not necessarily understand those experiences
better than another who merely observes the process or who reads
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vicarious descriptions prepared by one with clearer vision. Teaching through the clinical method is a very demanding process, and
the key to achieving meaningful clinical education is the effectiveness of the clinical instructor. As Dr. Lee Bolman has noted,
"learning in the field setting is often ineffective unless the learner
receives help from someone who is effective a t bridging theory
and practice and who is not locked into the defenses, rationalizations and rituals that may be present among practitioner^."^^

D. Structural Issues: Facilitation of the Teaching Enuironrnent
Clarity of perception about educational goals does not automatically translate into a beneficial result. Particularly in the
area of professional responsibility and in some aspects of skills
training the traditional teaching format must be altered and improved. Structural questions must be resolved in such a way that
an environment is created which will enable the instructor to
attain selected educational goals.26Course structure and format
are threshold matters that, depending on the degree and depth
25. L. Bolman, Learning and Lawyering: An Approach to Education for Legal Practice 6 (1977) (to be published in C. COOPER& C. ALDERFER,
ADVANCES
IN EXPERIENTIAL
SOCIAL
PROCESSES).
26. The analysis of the proper structure of legal education must be done with the
realization that law school, whether two years, three years, or perhaps even four years in
duration, has very finite limitations on what can be accomplished. The questions of what
educational goals should be given priority and how broadly or deeply the subject matter
should be learned arise within an educational environment that cannot be all things to
all people. That decisions must be made, the effect of which makes it unlikely that other
important educational goals can properly be served, should only make us take the task of
curricular redesign more seriously. The truth is that the existing structure has not undergone the kind of reflective and responsible review necessary for the answering of these
questions.
Factors that should be considered include (1) the scope of the student-practice rule
in the jurisdiction; (2) types of clients available; (3) existing court or administrative
systems; (4) types of adversaries; (5) caseload volume; (6) amount of academic credit
granted for the clinical course; (7) duration of the clinical experience; (8) amount of time
the clinical teacher has available to devote to clinical teaching; (9) quality of office administration; (10) availability of secretarial assistance; (11) physical facilities; (12) law office
budget, i.e., supplies, telephones, copying, etc.; (13) teaching resources, e.g., videotape
equipment, teaching materials; (14) access t o library facilities; and (15) attitudes of other
faculty members and law school administrators.
It is also desirable that the classifications of cases and systems within the legal process
be redefined. The categories of Civil-Criminal, Torts, Contracts, Procedure, etc., are only
useful for the structure of an outdated legal curriculum; they are too rigid for the future
demand of legal education. Whatever the new categories might be, they should (1) provide insight into legal, economic, and political institutions as well as judicial behavior;
(2) produce humanistic understanding and develop sensitive interpersonal skills; (3) develop a commitment to the constructive reform of basic systems; (4) integrate the experience of law school; (5) generate specific process and skill learning; and (6) develop the
judgmental and decisionmaking capability of the law student.
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of learning sought, will greatly influence the probability of
achieving the desired end.
Once these details of form are dealt with, we are still confronted by the complexity of the teaching relationship itself. Although it is not the purpose of this Commentary to explore the
question of individual techniques within the clinical teaching relationship, it must be noted that there are few kinds of teaching
more difficult and intellectually and humanistically challenging.27Conducting this kind of relationship, especially in the many
sensitive areas of professional responsibility, requires a willingness to confront one's own beliefs, values, and behavior on a
personally involved level rather than from the safe vantage point
of the external critic. It is not only the instructor's intellectual
rhetoric that is part of the relationship, but often more importantly the instructor's own behavior. Just as the special dynamics
of the clinical instruction of professional responsibility entails
acceptance of responsibility and performance by the clinical student, so the teaching process requires the instructor to "live out"
the theory he espouses. If there is a substantial difference between the instructor's actual behavior and the theoretical system
of responsibility he is presenting to the student, the teaching can
produce as much harm as good. To deal effectively with the issues
and problems clinical students can experience as they function as
lawyers-e. g., racism; dissimilar treatment of poor people;
abuses against certain classes of people by judges, prosecutors,
other lawyers, and police; the preservation of bar associations;
dishonesty; and laziness-requires substantial self-analysis and
sensitive use of subtle teaching skills. It seems fundamentally
true that these and many other areas of essential learning should
be covered during law school. It may be that it will take considerable time to develop the knowledge and skills necessary to carry
out this process in a highly effective manner. Nonetheless, given
an already unsuccessful alternative, it is certainly our responsibility to make the effort.

The clinical method as it relates to legal education can be
separated into three general models: strict, specialized, and com27. The degree of difficulty and challenge depends, of course, on the nature of the
educational goals sought by the instructor. As the need to help the student interpret
important internal professional responsibility problems increases, so will the emotional
and intellectual demands that the teaching relationship makes on the teacher.
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plementary. While each has significant potential as an instructional medium, the specific educational purposes for which each
model is best suited vary greatly. The strict clinical model contemplates a "teaching law office" conducted by the law school as
part of its curriculum. The model is best used to teach in goal
areas relating to professional responsibility. The specialized form
has many of the same structural characteristics of the strict
model, but the nature and kind of legal systems and issues with
which it deals are more radically limited. Its content is narrower
in scope, and experience in the specialized learning environment
can therefore be more intensely focused within a more restricted
range of coverage. The complementary model uses direct legal
experience to complement the learning of traditional subject matter commonly taught through use of the casebook method.

A. Model One: A Strict Adaptation of the Clinical Method
1. Definition of the model

The strict clinical model has three principal characteristics.
First, each student is given full professional responsibility for the
welfare of actual clients.28Second, the direct legal experiences the
student undergoes are structured so as to be of a kind, scope, and
depth adequate to generate the core from which the instructor
and student can produce the desired learning.29Finally, because
28. This places the burdens of responsibility and outcome squarely upon the individual student. If this is not done, the student will likely stop short of fully scrutinizing his
personal value system and anticipated professional behavior. This in turn will allow the
student to revert to an idealization of philosophical individual attitudes and professional
responses. Important questions of professional responsibility would then be reduced to
dialogues of "What would you do if . . .?," rather than "This is what you did. Why?"
The opportunity to internalize an understanding of personal behavior is the essence of this
adaptation of the clinical method, and without the clear assumption by the student of
professional responsibility, such internalization generally cannot be achieved.
29. Just as the selection of case materials is a critical aspect of the casebook method,
the selection of the direct legal experience to serve as the raw material for the clinical
student's learning is equally crucial. It is considerably more difficult and time consuming,
however, for the instructor to engage in this constantly evolving case-selection process in
a clinical course. Yet, if this is not done, the student's clinical learning experience can be
rendered largely inconsequential. There are qualities to some cases that make them far
better for achieving certain educational goals than others. In simplest terms, if the primary goal of a clinical course is a specific, substantive area or process (domestic relations,
tax, landlord-tenant, civil procedure), the cases selected will generally fall into those
categories. If the goals are those of professional responsibility, the selection of cases would
reflect those subject matters and court systems where the basic professional problems
arise. In that regard, it is fair to state that the criminal justice system provides a uniquely
suited laboratory for the examination of both the individual and systemic problems of
professional responsibility.
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of the complexity and subtlety of an educational process directed
toward issues of professional responsibility, there must be an individualized teacher-student relationship in which the teacher
strives continually to be aware of the experiences, special needs,
strengths, and biases of the student in order to translate this
information into a n individual learning process.30These same
three characteristics are the factors of the specific model that are
varied as the shift is made along the methodological continuum
from the strict to the complementary forms.31

T h e need for the strict model: Teaching affirmative value
systems

2.

At this point two critical questions regarding the teaching of
professional responsibility must be considered. First, what is
wrong with the way professional responsibility has been taught
historically? Second, even if past practices in this area have been
deficient, is it not possible to teach professional responsibility
sufficiently well by nonclinical rn-ethods and techniques?
In answering these questions, one must keep in mind the
extreme difficulty of teaching value systems and professional
behavior that are a t odds with the existing values of the legal
profession. When the value and behavioral systems being presented are consistent with the dominant values of the profession,
there is little difficulty in teaching by means of the "pervasive"
technique, classroom courses, and exercises in "professional responsibility," or through postgraduate firsthand experience.
When the value and behavior systems being taught vary from
those that prevail in the profession, different methods of instruction must be employed to enable the law student to develop and
understand more completely his personal value system. It is im30. The one-to-one teacher-student relationship enables the instructor to view the
attitudes, values, skills, needs, strengths, and sense of professional responsibility of each
student. In nonindividualized teaching situations, the student may easily "turn off' his
involvement, and the instructor may either be unaware or unable to respond. The teaching
essence of the strict adaptation of the clinical method is that the teacher observe, participate, counsel, advise, reflect, and review the behavior of the student a t the key points
where the student must deal with adversaries and institutions and make lawyering decisions.
31. As the educational goals shift from an orientation toward professional responsibility to specific processes and substance, the necessary relationship between teacher and
student is altered. For example, although low faculty-student ratios are helpful, a one-toone teaching relationship is not needed to facilitate in-depth learning in most technical
skill categories. The complementary model may require some additional administrative
assistance, but the faculty-student ratios and relationships need not differ from traditional seminar or problem formats.

10251

CLINICAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS

1043

portant here to note that the desire to retain power, prestige,
wealth, and influence and to preserve the vested interests in the
existing legal system affect everyone to some degree whether
within or without the profession. It is natural for any powerful
group to protect itself and its values. The legal profession is no
exception, and it has acted in predictable fashion. As a result, the
traditional format of legal education is now capable of conditioning virtually all law students to accept certain values as intrinsic
to the profession. According to the descriptions of some leading
commentators, the superstructure of legal education has evolved
into a mechanism serving a disturbingly restricted portion of
American society, while giving short shrift to the interests of the
numerical majority.32This elitist concentration on the preservation of entrenched property, wealth, and power does not represent
an impermissible goal; however, when it is effectively the sole
accepted focus of law school to the disregard of other fundamental
societal interests, it reflects an antidemocratic, antisocial, and
anti-intellectual process.
The need for status and money almost certainly plays an important role in the decision of many to attend law school. Thus,
to some extent the applicant pool "self-selects" along certain
value considerations. During law school these values are reinforced not only by the structure, content, and teaching of the
curriculum, but also by the similar values of student peers. Upon
entry into the profession, the new lawyer soon becomes aware of
the acknowledged hierarchical prestige structure among lawyers,
with status based on the type of law firm, clientele, and income.33
For the law student to have any viable chance to counter these
insistent forces requires the development of educational models
capable of providing the kind of experience, peer support, teacher
involvement, and professional standards that clarify fundamental value conflicts and assist the student to understand his value
system in relation to legal process. Through the use of such models the student will have had, a t the end of his intense law school
32. The past decade has produced a large volume of literature critical of legal education and the profession. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH,
note 12 supra; CURRICULUM
STUDY
PROJECT
OF AMERICAN
LAWSCHOOLS,
TRAINING
FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSIONS
COMMITTEE,
ASSOCIATION
OF THE LAW:1971 (P. Carrington ed. 1971) (AALS 1971 Annual Meeting Proceedings, Part
& T. EHRLICH,
NEWDIRECTIONS
IN LEGAL
One, Section 11) (Carrington report); H. PACKER
EDUCATION
(1972); Thorne, note 5 supra.
33. See Heinz, Laurnann, Cappell, Halliday, & Schaalman, Diversity, Representation, and Leadership i n an Urban Bar: A First Report on a Survey of the Chicago Bar,
1976 AM.B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH
J. 717.
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experience, the opportunity to decide on appropriate patterns of
individual behavior.""
One pattern of individual behavior that the clinical student
will experience is compromise. It is an undeniable fact that many
dealings in the real world involve the necessity of compromise. In
this regard the student will have been able to establish some of
the limits of compromise and to understand that, for matters of
personal integrity, lines must be clearly drawn if he is not to lose
a critical aspect of self-respect. This learning will have been
achieved within a supportive environment where the instructor is
in continual contact with the student as he confronts the problems of a lawyer.
3.

T h e educational dynamics of model one

The "teaching law office" of the strict model is staffed by law
instructors committed not only to client service, but also to the
teaching of selected aspects of professional responsibility. In this
. ~ ~ physical location
sense, it is not a value-free i n ~ t i t u t i o n The
utilized is not particularly important; however, some advantages
in time efficiency for both students and teachers are gained if the
program is located in the law
The important structural
goals of the strict form are to create a mechanism which, through
attention to such matters as adequate academic credit, length of
the student's clinical experience, caseload control, peer support,
and adequate time for proper instruction, creates an environment
that enhances the probability of attaining the educational goals
34. It is unrealistic to assume that even the best structured and taught clinical
programs are capable of making important differences in the professional behavior and
values of all students. The professional pressures of conformity will continue to exist
whether or not new lawyers have participated in a strict clinical model. The economic
structure of much of private practice, intense competition for a relatively limited number
of clients, will also continue for the foreseeable future.
The structure of the profession at its lower status levels tends to create a model of
lawyer behavior characterized by inadequate preparation and inability to develop further
legal skills and reflectiveness. This indicates that the clinical method represents only one
of the changes required; indeed, efforts to reform must occur simultaneously on several
institutional levels.
35. Bellow, supra note 18, a t 376: "[Instructional] method, like all other forms of
human endeavor, is not value-free."
36. There are several advantages to having the physical location of a clinical program
in the law school. Intellectual interaction between clinical and nonclinical instructors is
facilitated. In addition, such a location continually reminds the clinical instructor that
his primary role is to teach. The law school setting also allows the law student to spontaneously interact and counsel with clinical instructors as issues arise. More importantly,
instructors can better take advantage of "teaching moments9'-when ideas and potential
insights can best be internalized by the students.
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and of providing competent representation to clients.37
Most of the actual cases handled under the clinical method
involve indigent clients. This is due partly to the desire of the
private bar to protect its sources of income, the inability of many
poor individuals to afford the fees of established attorneys, and
the restrictive language of most state student-practice rules.
Even if, however, the cases of indigents did not naturally gravitate toward clinical programs, it would still be necessary to seek
them out, for it is in the representation of these clients that the
deepest insights into the nature of society and of one's relationship to it can be found. The clear message of the past and present
is one of abuse of power, bias, and discrimination. The exercise
of power against the indigent client reveals a great deal about the
existing legal, economic, and social institutions and about ourselves. It is within this context that the following observations
about the operation of the strict application of the clinical
method are made.
Typically, the student's role as a lawyer is to protect his
client from someone attempting to assert power from a preferred
position. This requirement makes it necessary for the student to
associate and identify with the ragged edges of people whose values are neither compatible with one another nor, since the law
student often possesses the values of a more privileged social
class, with those of the student. The student will experience and
must attempt to resolve the frustrations that result both from
interactions with clients, adverse parties and attorneys, judges,
police, and court personnel and from his own attitudes toward the
particular case.
As the student involves himself in the role and experiences
of the lawyer, he is immediately confronted by what are to him
frightening and sometimes almost incomprehensible responsibilities. The student recognizes that any inadequacy on his part may
mean that his client will be injured. The incredible tension created by the assumption of direct responsibility for client affairs,
the need to function in the external legal world as a lawyer, the
inherent confusion of the experience, and the fact that every act
takes place under the constant scrutiny of an instructor generate
37. Creating the proper learning environment is much more difficult under the strict
model than with traditional course formats. If the office structure does not provide a
situation capable of permitting the instructor and student to do that which is necessary
for in-depth learning to occur, the use of the clinical educational method can be counterproductive. It is difficult to teach responsibility and competence in an incompetent atmosphere.

1046

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I977

an enormous "need for meaning." From this process can come a
vastly greater understanding of inner strengths and weaknesses
as well as a knowledge of the student's tolerance levels with respect to pressure and systemic hypocrisy.

B. Model Two: A Specialized Adaptation
The characteristics of the specialized model are in many
ways similar to those of the strict m0de1,~"he primary distinction
being in the scope and depth of the direct experience. The clinical
content of the specialized model will often take the form of a
specific kind of subject matter with the intent of concentrating
in a particular area or in limited areas. Examples of this restriction to a particular subject matter for case selection are juvenile,
landlord-tenant, domestic relations, and consumer law. Alternatively, the specialization may be focused in terms of process, such
as interviewing, counseling, negotiation, and trial or appellate
advocacy. The content of the learning environment is considerably less rich with regard to the range of subject matter dealt with,
but a t the same time it is potentiallyy more intense within the
narrower systems selected.39The critical difference between the
specialized model and the strict model is that the narrowing of
subject matter reduces the usefulness of the specialized form in
achieving broad recognition of the legal system, perception of
variations in the role of the lawyer, and an ability to generalize
experiences across several components of the legal system in order
to identify the interaction of key institutions.
The extent to which the narrowing of subject matter occurs
within the specialized model is a function of the restrictiveness
of the case and client selection process. The specialized model can
be either so broadened as to approximate the strict form of the
clinical method or so specifically concentrated that it becomes a
complementary adjunct to a particular traditional course. As the
model becomes increasingly more specialized, it moves away from
the ability to produce significant learning in professional respon38. For a discussion of the characteristics of the strict model, see notes 28-30 and
accompanying text supra.
39. When the experience is limited to one or two areas of substance or process,
students can effectively become "experts" in many areas. An important question, however, is whether there is any need during law school to develop expertise in law students.
The answer traditionally may be in the negative, but upon reevaluation of the goals and
societal purposes of legal education, a different conclusion may be required. The provision
of legal services to indigent clients and the special needs of a solo or small-firm private
practitioner are two areas that one could reasonably conclude might merit a special
curriculum.
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sibility areas;" a t the same time, however, its ability to teach
specific process, substance, and technical lawyer skills is enhanced.

C. Model Three: T h e Complementary Adaptation
The third adaptation of the clinical method involves the use
of direct experience as a complement to a specific course subject
matter taught primarily by the casebook method. Under this
model, the specific educational goal in question could be the
learning of the substance of any particular law school course. This
adaptation exists to enrich the understanding of the course material in terms of traditional content. The use of direct experience
in this manner differs significantly from both the strict and specialized models. Regardless of the difference in their primary educational goals, the strict and specialized models both involve substantial commitments of teacher and student time and the full
acceptance by the student of the lawyering role. Although the
goals and kinds of problems that characterize the first two models
differ, each model follows the basic pattern of the teaching law
office. The complementary model, on the other hand, would more
likely involve relatively superficial and limited participation by
the law student in client cases.41The student may be less a responsible participant than an observer of the action. In addition,
the instructor is free to assume much of the traditional professional role since cases are normally coordinated through administrators or staff attorneys as part of the resources made available
to classroom instructors by the law school. By adopting this
model, the instructor has concluded that his course will benefit
to some degree if the specific data of direct legal reality is joined
with the subject matter the students are experiencing through the
casebook. The complementary adaptation of the clinical method
is far removed from the strict form. Under the complementary
model there is little necessity for the students to assume longterm professional responsibility for the client. Moreover, the vol40. If, for example, the specialized model is restricted only to domestic relations
cases, the law student generally will be exposed to only one type of court system, one type
of adversary, etc. As a result, the student is more limited in the types of professional
responsibility problems he will confront than in a clinical course that follows the strict
model.
41. Since under the complementary model both student and instructor usually spend
a substantial amount of time in nonclinical processes, the time spent in preparation for
and participation in actual cases is significantly diminished.
Because of this time constraint, much of the quality and depth of the clinical experience is necessarily lost.
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ume and type of cases are generally restricted to a single category,
and the relationship between the students and the instructor differs little from the traditional format.

D. Models Involving Simulated E x p e r i e n ~ e ~ ~
The role of simulated experience as an educational method
can be structured in a format similar to t h a t of the clinical
method. The fundamental distinction is that simulated experiences, while direct and genuine in their own way, do not involve
the full reality of the actual process. Students may undergo a
"real" simulated trial or negotiation; these experiences can be
educationally valid to the extent they are carefully developed in
structure and content. There is, however, a difference; that difference of nonreality makes the clinical method superior to the simulated process for certain purposes. Not only are simulated experiences characterized by a noticeable absence of richness and
unpredictability, but they also produce a veneer that is too superficial to generate the tension and, more importantly, the subtleties of irrationality and interaction of systemic components that
are natural and inevitable products of legal realities. But up to a
point these latter considerations are not necessarily important,
and a great deal of learning can occur in the preliminary stages
of a student's development in technical skills, process analysis,
and understanding of legal principles through the use of simulated methods.

VI. CONCLUSION
Too much confusion has existed about the goals and methodology of clinical legal education. This has resulted primarily
because of a failure to separate the clinical method as a theoretical abstraction from the values, educational goals, and subject
matter through which the method is generally applied. The clinical "method" differs from the Langdellian casebook method in
only one way. The casebook method uses vicariously experienced
data, generally in the form of edited appellate court decisions, as
its source of educational material. The clinical method uses as its
educational source directly experienced or "firsthand" data.
While the abstract difference represented by this dichotomy in
educational material can be simply stated, the implications of the
-

-

42. For a disucssion of the pedagogical limits of simulated methods, see Meltsner &
Schrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUM.
L. REV.581, 592-608 (1976).
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distinction are fundamental and far-reaching. It is a t this point
that the so-called debate over the educational validity of the
clinical method must be exposed for what it is.
The clinical method is a challenge to the basic values and
goals of many traditional legal educators. It implies that the values and educational goals of legal education have been too narrow
and too rigid, serving well a limited category of the legal profession while standing contemptuously aloof from the needs of other
lawyers and society. Although there is substantial room for re' sponsible dialogue between persons seeking reform and those who
prefer to maintain the traditional education model, it must also
be realized that a t some point the interests of persons on both
sides may be so fundamentally dissimilar as to be irreconcilable.
Properly conceived and applied, a strict model of clinical
legal instruction has a distinctive and unequalled ability in
teaching important aspects of professional responsibility. In the
other educational goal areas of analysis, substantive law, and
legal skills, there are combinations of educational techniques and
methods potentially superior or equal to the clinical method. For
these reasons, the three primary adaptations of the clinical
method were outlined and their unique capabilities identified.
It is clear that clinical legal education is a t a crossroads in
its brief history. The events of the next few years will determine
the direction that will be taken. While there is little doubt that
clinical programs will continue to exist as a t least an incidental
part of legal education, it is not a t all certain that the clinical
reform will have any greater impact than that. Clinical educators
must therefore insure that clinical education is understood as a
theoretical methodology; that its role is clarified in terms of the
challenge it poses to the values and goals of traditional legal
education; that the special educational capabilities of clinical
courses are understood; and that the organization, administration, and instruction in existing clinical programs are substantially improved.

